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Showing posts with label tax. Show all posts
Showing posts with label tax. Show all posts

2013-03-21

Kicking it up a notch: Anti-kickback statute gets expanded . . . by the tax code

Starting on January 1, 2014, it is very likely that the federal anti-kickback statute (AKS) will directly apply to items and services covered by private health insurance, which it has never done before. Currently, the AKS applies to items and services furnished under health care programs such as Medicare, Medicaid (and similar programs), TriCare, and Veteran’s Administration (VA) benefits (and indirectly to items and services covered by private health insurance in certain circumstances).

Below is a brief look at what the AKS is, penalties under the AKS, why the new tax credit causes the AKS to be implicated in a wider range of items and services than it has been historically, and finally, the potential real-world impact of the change. If you’re familiar with the AKS already, feel free to skip to the “expansion” section below.

Executive Summary

January 1, 2014 is the effective date of a new refundable tax credit in the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C. § 36B) that provides for direct payments from the federal government to private health insurance companies to cover at least some of the health insurance premiums for certain taxpayers with incomes under 400% of the federal poverty level. The Congressional Budget Office estimates (PDF) that this will describe about 8 million people in 2014, increasing to approximately 20 million people in 2022.* As explained below, under the explicit terms of the AKS, this almost certainly makes the items and services furnished under those health insurance plans subject to the AKS.

Because of how the tax credit is calculated and how AKS is enforced (discussed below), this also likely means that people and organizations in the health care industry—including landlords for health care providers—should treat the AKS as applicable to all items and services, regardless of whether they are reimbursable by Medicare, Medicaid, subsidized private insurance, or unsubsidized private insurance. Health care providers and their suppliers who deal exclusively with private-pay patients and do not accept any insurance whatsoever are less likely affected for patients under their direct care, but will still need to be careful about referral arrangements. 

What is the AKS?

The AKS, very generally, is a federal law that penalizes “whoever” offers, pays, solicits, or receives “any remuneration” in exchange for patient referrals or the furnishing, receiving, or recommendation of items or services even partially covered by a “Federal health care program” (FHCP) to which the government even partially makes direct payments. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1), (2).

And yes, “whoever”, really means “whoever”: from doctors, to nurses, radiology clinics, laboratories, pharmacists, pharmaceutical sales representatives, delivery drivers, custodial staff, landlords for health care items and service providers, and even patients; likewise, “any remuneration” really means “any”: from season tickets to baseball games, to envelopes full of cash, a landlord charging higher rent to a doctor (as compared to an accountant) for an office across the street from a hospital, a physical therapist waiving copayments for patients, or even a pharmacy giving out coupons for $0.50 off of a movie ticket. 

In the more than 40 years of the existence of the AKS and its predecessors, there has never been a minimum threshold for an FHCP’s partial coverage of an item or service, the government’s partial payment to an FHCP, or the amount of “remuneration” at issue: a fraction of a penny for any of those purposes is theoretically enough to implicate the AKS. See https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/safeharborregulations/072991.htm (search for de minimis).

AKS (and other) penalties

The penalties for violating the AKS are stiff: a felony conviction plus up to a $25,000 fine, five years in prison, possible exclusion from being reimbursed for providing items or services to anyone enrolled in an FHCP, plus assessment of additional “civil monetary penalties” (CMPs). CMPs are also applicable in certain broader situations and will be the subject of another post. 

On top of that, the AKS explicitly provides that any claims filed that result from an arrangement that violates the AKS are now automatically deemed “false claims”, which brings additional penalties under the False Claims Act (FCA). See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(g). There are some additional FCA-related issues that will be discussed in a future post.

Finally, the AKS explicitly does not require any specific intent to violate it—meaning that you only need to be aware that you're doing something, but you do not need to know that that “something” is prohibited by the AKS. The AKS also explicitly provides that you don’t need to know that the AKS even exists to be guilty of violating it. So if you are involved in any way with delivering or receiving health care items or services, now, more than ever, you ignore the AKS at your peril. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(h).

AKS expansion beyond its historical reach

The AKS directly applies only to items and services services furnished under FHCPs, which are commonly—yet not entirely accurately—understood to mean programs such as Medicare, Medicaid (and similar programs), TriCare, and the VA.

So, what is an FHCP? An FHCP is defined by statute as:

any plan or program that provides health benefits, whether directly, through insurance, or otherwise, which is funded directly, in whole or in part, by the United States Government (other than the health insurance program under chapter 89 of title 5 [of the United States Code])...

42 U.S.C. 1320a-7b(f)(1) (emphasis added). An FHCP also specifically includes Medicaid and Title V and XX programs. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(f)(2); 42 C.F.R. § 1001.2.

The “health insurance program under chapter 89 of title 5”, is otherwise known as the “Federal Employees Health Benefits Program”, or FEHBP. The FEHBP is the private health insurance program for federal civilian employees, under which the federal government makes direct payments to health insurance companies to cover part of the premiums for eligible beneficiaries. The applicable statute and regulations specifically exempt only the FEHBP from the definition of FHCP, implying that the FEHBP would otherwise be included in the AKS’s definition of an FHCP.

Starting January 1, 2014, 26 U.S.C. § 36B (enacted by Pub. L. 111-148 § 1401) provides a refundable tax credit for individuals whose health insurance costs exceed certain thresholds as a proportion of income. It is not clear whether this credit alone would cause these individuals’ insurance to become an FHCP (my view: likely yes, because the credit is issued specifically to subsidize health insurance premiums, but this will be fully explored in yet another future post), but coupled with how this credit is paid on behalf of taxpayers (below), and without a specific statutory exception, in my view it almost certainly makes certain private health insurance qualify as an FHCP under the AKS.

42 U.S.C. § 18082(c)(2)(A) (enacted by Pub. L. 111-148 § 1411) provides that the Secretary of the Treasury shall make “advance payment” in the amount of the applicable credit “to the issuer of a qualified health plan” on a monthly basis to cover partial health insurance premiums on behalf of eligible taxpayers. See also 26 C.F.R. § 1.36B-2 (affirming the Secretary’s decision to make monthly advance premium payments).

Because the government makes direct payments to private health insurers, anyone who has government-subsidized insurance through those insurers is enrolled in a “program that provides health benefits ... through insurance ... which is funded directly, in whole or in part, by the United States Government” and which is not described in Title 5, Chapter 89 of the US Code. Assuming that “payment . . . to the issuer of a qualified health plan” from the Treasury is equivalent to “funded directly” by the Government—and without serious contortions of the English language, that seems to be a fair assumption, particularly given the specific exclusion of only the FEHBP from the definition of FHCP, but no specific exclusion for advance premium payments from the definition of FHCP—the AKS applies.

Still, how can one be sure of whether a health insurance plan or benefit qualifies as an FHCP? A question was recently raised on an American Health Lawyers Association email list that I moderate about whether the federal government maintains a public list of FHCPs to which the AKS applies. One benefit of such list would be that if the government maintained such a list, people could definitively know whether or not they are subject to the AKS.

The answer appears to be that there is no such official list, and the government presumably has little incentive to maintain such a list. Why? Two reasons: 1) The AKS is intentionally broad, so publishing a list might implicitly narrow its possible scope of enforcement in a manner not authorized or intended by Congress; and 2) The definition of FHCP is so broad that it is really only feasible to explain what an FHCP is not, as shown by this flow chart (start in the bottom left):




This makes the advance premium payment issue essentially a two-step inquiry (putting aside the tax credit offered to taxpayers without advance premium payments, and assuming that we are not discussing the FEHBP): 1) Is that insurance “any . . . insurance . . . other than” the FEHBP? Yes. 2) Through advance premium payments to health insurers, does the government directly pay for any portion of health insurance or health care? Yes. Therefore it is an FHCP and the AKS is directly implicated. 

For those who may be interested in seeing a non-exclusive list of other programs that likely qualify as FHCPs (with one exception), it is available here: 42 U.S.C. § 14402(d) (prohibiting federal funding for assisted suicide). However, that list is not specifically incorporated into the AKS, so it is best to not rely on the list for anything other than its stated purpose.

Interesting, but what does this mean in the real world?

One problem for anyone involved in patient care is that the Treasury’s advance premium payments can fluctuate on a monthly basis with respect to any person depending on their income; that is, the Treasury could make payments in some months, but not others. Because under the AKS’s definition of FHCP, the advance premium payment makes the applicable insurance program an FHCP, it is not possible to tell who is or will be enrolled in an FHCP at any given time. Therefore, because of the high stakes involved in violating the AKS, it may be appropriate to treat all privately-insured patients as if the advance premium payment is being made on their behalf, and thus, as if they are enrolled in an FHCP. This would mean that any items or services furnished to them or their health care providers or suppliers would be treated as subject to the AKS.

What does this really mean, in practice, though? Honestly, probably not much for health care items and services providers who already serve or treat a mix of Medicare, Medicaid, etc., and privately-insured patients: they probably already are (or at least, should be) treading lightly around AKS issues because of the AKS’s longstanding indirect applicability to private insurance benefits.

The AKS currently indirectly applies to private insurance benefits in certain circumstances because the Office of Inspector General (OIG) of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the entity responsible for enforcing the AKS, has consistently explained for many years that any remuneration arrangement related only to private insurance benefits that could possibly influence FHCP referrals or other business would likely implicate the AKS as well. See https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/advisoryopinions/2000/ao00_8.pdf; https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/advisoryopinions/2012/AdvOpn12-06.pdf. Specifically, the OIG has relatively consistently declined to extend “safe harbor” protection to remuneration arrangements that apply to privately-reimbursable items and services but “carve out” FHCP-covered items and services, meaning that OIG is essentially reserving the right to pursue penalties at any time for remuneration arrangements subject to “carve outs”.

If this stance is any guide, then although the AKS will directly apply only to items and services reimbursable by subsidized private insurance, by extension, it should indirectly apply also to items and services reimbursable by unsubsidized private insurance, because of the potential influence on subsidized referrals.

Therefore, for people or organizations who do not typically deal with currently-recognized FHCPs, e.g., physicians in independent practices that don’t participate in Medicare, Medicaid, or similar programs, the advance premium payment system should be cause to seriously and thoroughly evaluate all of their business and referral relationships.

Remaining questions

There are many remaining questions about potential exceptions, the full scope of the changes, and effects in conjunction with related laws. Stay tuned...

* See Table 3. These figures are the sum of the “Exchanges” population less “Number of Unsubsidized Exchange Enrollees”.

© 2013 Alex M. Hendler. All Rights Reserved. This post is not legal advice. Please consult an attorney to discuss you particular facts or circumstances.

2010-03-23

PPACA your bags, we're headed to Taxes

Now that the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) has been signed into law, what, specifically, does PPACA do, tax-wise? Let's take a look at the so-called "individual mandate".

Very briefly, under PPACA, you (generally) will be subject to a financial "penalty" if you don't buy or otherwise get health insurance. Some people are not happy about this. Let's look at the law first, and then what people are saying about it.

What the law actually does

Under the current (pre-reconciliation) version of PPACA, specifically, § 1501, which will add § 5000A to the Internal Revenue Code, starting in 2014, for each month you do not have health insurance you must pay a nominal "penalty" of about $8 a month, ramping up to $62.50 per month in 2016 and thereafter. Generally insurance premiums are much higher than that, so this does not provide much incentive to purchase insurance coverage.

Fortunately, PPACA § 10106 addresses that problem: "Section 5000A(b)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as added by section 1501(b) of this Act, is amended to read as follows...." Pardon me? Instead of enacting what you meant to enact, you enact something else, then amend it? In the same piece of legislation? We'll get to that later.

I'll summarize to spare you the pain of reading it yourself: Under PPACA's amendment to its own new § 5000A of the Internal Revenue Code, you would pay either the average nationwide monthly premium, or the greater of a fixed dollar amount or 2% of your income (fully phased in in 2016), if that amount is less than the average nationwide monthly premium. (HR 4872 would make further adjustments to this formula). In fake algebra: penalty = lesser of (average premium or (greater of (fixed dollar amount or percentage of income))).

Alternatively, you could just buy health insurance and not worry about it; if you can't afford insurance, you're likely eligible for a subsidy.

Without ascribing any motive to Congress, there are some potentially interesting things happening here. If Congress is adding a new legal provision, why add the provision in full, then amend it in the same bill? Doesn't this approach just double or triple (or more) the work of someone trying to find out what the law is? Briefly: Yes.

At least one benefit is that this approach conveniently embeds the legislative history within the Act itself, which can aid future inquiries into congressional intent should any litigation arise. Perhaps it could also allow an offending provision to be more easily severed in case of a constitutional or other legal issue. As for other benefits, it could help prepare people for the frustration and confusion of driving in Washington, D.C., or serve as a component of cognitive stimulation therapy—I'm guessing they weren't intentionally headed in those directions, though....

Another potentially interesting issue is Congress's choice to impose a "penalty" under the tax code for failing to purchase insurance, rather than impose a tax and exempt people from that tax if they purchase insurance. Potato, potahto, you might say—it is the same result. That is, unless you are a red-State Attorney General up for reelection this year. Which brings us to....

What people claim the law does

The New York Times recently published an article describing how various State Attorneys General plan to sue to enjoin implementation of provisions of PPACA that these officials allege force people to buy insurance. (See also the Washington Post's opinion piece). The Times article indicates that various constitutional law scholars suggest that these challenges will "amount to no more than a speedbump" on the way to implementing PPACA for a variety of reasons, one of which is that the penalty payment is tied Congress' taxing power authorized by the Constitution.

For the originalists out there, the 16th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution reads:
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.
The Times article describes legal scholars' views that the Supreme Court has very broadly construed Congress's "power to lay and collect taxes". Congress has been doing this for Medicare for more than 40 years: If you're employed by someone else, you currently pay a 1.45% tax on your income from that employment; if you're self-employed, it's about 2.9%. Under PPACA, if you make more than $200,000 in employment income per year (or $250,000 if you file a joint return), you will pay an extra 0.5% of your income, starting in 2013.

Clearly, that is a tax, and it funds insurance (Medicare Part A). It differs from the PPACA penalty in several respects: 1) This is a mandatory payment to the government; and 2) there's no guarantee that you'll actually become a beneficiary of the system (you and the Medicare program both need to survive until you're 65 or sufficiently disabled). Apparently, these Attorneys General have no problem with Medicare. They seem to accept that the government can make you pay taxes to support a government insurance program that you may never use, but they don't seem to accept that the government can give you a choice: pay tax penalties or purchase private insurance that you could use today.

What is the reasoned basis for this objection? I don't have an answer, but PJ O'Rourke asks a similar question, implying that if the Attorneys General (he singles one out, but I won't) wanted to be ideologically consistent, they would be pushing for a single-payer health care system, like the one we had for sailors more than 200 years ago.

I do not pretend to know enough about the intricacies of the Internal Revenue Code or income tax jurisprudence to opine on Congress's motives for implementing this provision via a "penalty" rather than a "tax", however, based on the plain text of the bill itself and the other provisions surrounding it, imposing a penalty under the tax code does not seem substantially different from directly imposing a tax. Admittedly, neither "tax" nor "penalty" appear to be explicitly defined within the Internal Revenue Code or the Constitution—although we can all agree that both are money that must be paid to the government and are not attached to a criminal offense (i.e., they are not fines).

In case of any doubt about the penalty's status as a "tax", enter the Commerce Clause (U.S. Const. Art. 1 § 8 cl. 3): Congress explicitly incorporated "findings" (see PPACA § 1501) indicating that health insurance and health care services constitute "interstate commerce", and that the penalty is a way to regulate that commerce. So, not only is it a "tax", but it also regulates interstate commerce (at least, Congress intends for it to do so). Belt with suspenders, anyone? If you're curious, U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608-09 (2000), presents a good overview of Congress's (very) broad power to regulate interstate commerce; I am no Constitutional scholar, but the penalty provision seems to be well within that power.

The Post's opinion piece (see above) does raise an interesting point, however: "the individual mandate extends the commerce clause's power beyond economic activity, to economic inactivity".

It would be a more interesting point if it did not rest on such shaky ground: 1) The penalty is functionally indistinguishable from a "tax" (see above), and thus, does not necessarily emanate from the Commerce Clause; and 2) the statement incorrectly assumes that people who don't buy insurance don't have an economic effect on health care. For example, if an uninsured person goes to an emergency room to get primary care treatment, and doesn't pay the bill (PDF), that person is engaging in economic activity by causing the emergency room to incur expenses, which then get passed on to paying customers (patients, rather). Sounds like commerce to me. The "penalty" imposed by PPACA is designed to discourage or offset that negative economic activity. Similarly, if the uninsured person does pay, clearly, that is economic activity. Perhaps I'm missing something, but does anyone see a legitimate Constitutional issue here?

Thoughts, comments?

© 2010 Alex M. Hendler. All Rights Reserved.